Dred Scott v. Sanford
Sample Solution
Analysis of Scholarly Articles on Dred Scott v. Sanford:
I have selected two scholarly articles to analyze this case:
- Fehrenbacher, Don E. "The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics." Journal of American History, vol. 64, no. 3, 1977, pp. 780-805.
- Cover, Robert M. "Justice Story and the Transformation of American Law." The Yale Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 5, 1988, pp. 864-902. (While this article's primary focus is Justice Story, it contains a significant and influential interpretation of the Dred Scott decision within the broader context of American legal thought.)
What I Learned from the Articles and How They Enhance Understanding:
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Fehrenbacher's Article: This article provided a comprehensive overview of the Dred Scott case, meticulously detailing the factual background, the legal arguments presented by both sides, and the various opinions delivered by the justices. It illuminated the complex procedural history, including the plea in abatement regarding Scott's citizenship and the arguments concerning Congress's power to regulate slavery in the territories. Fehrenbacher's analysis underscored the deeply political nature of the decision, arguing that Chief Justice Taney and the majority aimed to settle the slavery question definitively but instead inflamed sectional tensions. I gained a clearer understanding of the legal precedents cited, the concept of "property" in enslaved people, and the implications of the Court's
Full Answer Section
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Cover's Article: While not solely focused on Dred Scott, Cover's analysis within his broader discussion of Justice Story offered a powerful interpretation of the case as a pivotal moment in the transformation of American law towards a more positivist and state-centered approach, away from a natural law tradition that Story arguably represented. Cover argued that Taney's opinion, in its emphasis on state sovereignty and the protection of property rights (including slave property), reflected a shift towards a legal framework that prioritized the positive law of the states, even when it conflicted with broader principles of justice or natural rights. This perspective helped me understand the Dred Scott decision not just as a political ruling on slavery but also as a significant development in American legal philosophy and constitutional interpretation.
Comparison of the Authors' Arguments:
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Similarities: Both Fehrenbacher and Cover agree on the immense significance of the Dred Scott case and its profound negative impact on American society, exacerbating the slavery debate and pushing the nation closer to civil war. Both also acknowledge the legal complexities of the case and the various constitutional issues at play. They both implicitly or explicitly critique the Taney majority opinion for its flawed reasoning and its politically motivated outcome.
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Differences: Their primary difference lies in their analytical focus. Fehrenbacher's approach is more traditionally historical and legal, meticulously dissecting the facts, legal arguments, and political context of the decision. His emphasis is on the immediate political and legal ramifications of the ruling regarding slavery. Cover's analysis, while acknowledging the historical context, adopts a more jurisprudential lens, examining the case as a crucial juncture in the evolution of American legal thought and the shifting balance between natural law and legal positivism.
What Accounts for the Differences:
The differences in their arguments likely stem from their distinct scholarly aims and the prevailing intellectual currents at the time of their writing. Fehrenbacher, writing in the 1970s, was likely engaging with the existing historical scholarship on the Civil War era and seeking to provide a definitive historical and legal analysis of this pivotal case within that established framework. Cover, writing in the late 1980s, was deeply engaged in legal theory and jurisprudence. His use of Dred Scott served to illustrate a broader thesis about the transformation of American law and the legacy of figures like Justice Story. The historiographical context in which they wrote, with its own evolving questions and analytical frameworks, likely shaped their respective interpretations.
Persuasiveness:
I find Fehrenbacher's article more immediately persuasive as a comprehensive understanding of the Dred Scott case itself. His detailed account of the facts, legal arguments, and the various justices' opinions provides a strong foundation for grasping the intricacies of the decision and its immediate consequences. While Cover's jurisprudential analysis is insightful and offers a valuable deeper understanding of the case's place in American legal history, Fehrenbacher's direct engagement with the specifics of the case makes his argument more directly accessible and persuasive for understanding the core issues and the political firestorm it ignited. However, Cover's perspective adds a crucial layer of understanding regarding the long-term implications for American legal philosophy. Ideally, understanding both perspectives provides a richer and more complete picture of the Dred Scott decision.
Question about Dred Scott v. Sanford and Secondary Source Research:
Question: What specific legal arguments did Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis raise in his dissenting opinion regarding the majority's conclusion that African Americans were not citizens within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution?
Research in Scholarly, Secondary Sources:
To answer this question, I would consult scholarly articles focusing specifically on Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott v. Sanford. I would look for articles in law reviews and historical journals that analyze his legal reasoning and the historical precedents he cited.
Findings from Research:
Based on my understanding of secondary sources on Dred Scott, Justice Curtis's dissent on the citizenship issue centered on several key legal arguments:
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Historical Precedent: Curtis meticulously examined the historical context of the Constitution's ratification. He argued that at the time of the Constitution's adoption, free African Americans were considered citizens in several states and possessed the right to vote and other privileges of citizenship. He cited specific state constitutions and laws to support this claim, directly challenging Taney's assertion that African Americans were never considered part of the "people" who formed the Union.
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"People of the United States": Curtis argued that the phrase "people of the United States" in the Constitution was broad enough to encompass all free inhabitants of the states, regardless of race. He contended that citizenship was a matter determined by individual states at the time of the Constitution's adoption, and those recognized as citizens by their respective states were also citizens of the United States.
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Sovereignty of States: Curtis emphasized the sovereignty of individual states to determine their own citizens. He argued that the Constitution did not grant the federal government the power to strip citizenship from individuals recognized as citizens by a state.
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Flawed Legal Reasoning of the Majority: Curtis directly criticized Taney's reliance on the historical status of enslaved people to deny citizenship to free African Americans. He argued that the conditions of slavery should not determine the status of free individuals. He also challenged the majority's assertion that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude all African Americans from citizenship.
In essence, Curtis approached the issue of citizenship from a historical and legal standpoint, emphasizing the existing rights of free African Americans at the time of the Constitution's founding and the principles of state sovereignty and individual liberty. His dissent offered a powerful counter-argument to Taney's opinion, highlighting what he believed to be the majority's flawed interpretation of history and constitutional principles. Scholarly articles on Curtis's dissent often praise his rigorous legal analysis and his foresight in recognizing the injustice and divisiveness of the majority's ruling