McGinn’s argument, in “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem

write a paper on either (a) one of the ten topics below or (b) a topic of your own design.

1. Present, explain and assess McGinn’s argument, in “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?,” for the claim that we are cognitively closed to P, the natural property that explains how brain processes generate conscious experience.
2. Compare and contrast McGinn’s position in “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” with Nagel’s position in “What is it Like to be a Bat?.”
3. Present, explain, and assess Chalmers’s argument, in “Consciousness and its place in nature,” that type-C materialism is either untenable or collapses into type-A materialism, type-B materialism, type-D dualism, or type-F monism.
4. Present, explain and assess Montero’s argument, in “Post-Physicalism,” that, “Instead of construing [the mind-body problem] as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world” (p. 322).
5. In “Physicalism, Old School,” Howell proposes and defends a neo-Cartesian definition of a physical property. Present, explain, and assess his proposal.
6. Present, explain, and assess Ney’s argument, in “Physicalism as an attitude,” that physicalism should be construed as an attitude rather than as a truth-evaluable thesis.
7. Present, explain and assess Maxwell’s response, in “Rigid designators and mind-brain identity,” to Kripke’s argument against the identity theory.
8. Present, explain, and assess Kind’s argument, in “Pessimism about Russellian monism,” that Russellian monism fails to transcend the dualist/physicalist divide.
9. Present, explain, and assess Strawson’s argument, in “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism,” that physicalism entails panpsychism.
10. In “The paradox of phenomenal judgment,” Chalmers argues that there is a paradox of phenomenal judgment. Present, explain, and assess his argument.