MOD 5 DISCUSSION CROSS CULTURE HEALTHCARE

MOD 5 DISCUSSION CROSS CULTURE HEALTHCARE The icebreaker for this Discussion is as follows: share a quote with the class that reflects something about you, your life, and your experiences. Discuss the case surrounding self-help guru James Arthur Ray, who was recently sentenced to two years in prison for the deaths of three people in a 2009 sweat lodge ceremony in Arizona. What are your thoughts about his conviction and sentence? Is there a line between protecting cultural traditional healing and protecting people's lives/health? If so, what is the line? Who determines it? Please remember everyone is entitled to express their opinions and discussions or differences of opinion must remain respectful.   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/19/james-arthur-ray-sentenced_n_1102753.html Ó Springer 2007 Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 79:395–405 DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9405-5 Stakeholder Management Capability: A Discourse–Theoretical Approach ABSTRACT. Since its inception, Stakeholder Management Capability (SMC) has constituted a powerful hermeneutic through which business organizations have understood and leveraged stakeholder relationships. On this model, achieving a high level of capability largely depends on managerial ability to effectively bargain with stakeholders and establish solidarity vis-a`-vis the successful negotiation, implementation, and execution of "win– win" transactional exchanges. Against this account, it is rightly pointed out that a transactional explanation of stakeholder relationships, regarded by many as the bottom line for stakeholder management, fails to provide managerial direction regarding how to resolve a variety of normative stakeholder claims that resist commoditization. In response to this issue, this paper has two overlapping goals. It seeks to elaborate a discourse theoretical approach to the problem by first drawing out Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action and delineating the various types of rational discourse. Second, the paper attempts to present concrete implications for SMC relative to reshaping the contours of rational, process, and transactional analysis in light of central discourse theoretical conclusions. KEY WORDS: critical theory, discourse ethics, stakeholder management capability, stakeholder management theory, communicative action Introduction Managerial stakeholder models often represent attempts to understand and describe a wide variety of business relationships as forms of transactional Dr. Abe J. Zakhem works primarily in the areas of ethical theory and business ethics. He has worked in private industry as a senior management consultant and chief operating officer and is currently an assistant professor at Seton Hall University. Abe Zakhem exchange. In very general terms, transactional relationships involve the mutual and voluntary trade of assets for gain. Now broadly construed, ‘‘assets’’ correspond to a wide range of tangible (e.g., capital and labor) and intangible (e.g., goodwill and social capital) interests and associated metrics. Since its original characterization (Freeman, 1984), the notion of Stakeholder Management Capability (SMC) has constituted one of the more influential and transactional frameworks for understanding and leveraging stakeholder relationships. Essentially, SMC involves managerial analysis at rational, process, and transactional levels. Corresponding to each level of analysis, managers are charged with: 1) mapping stakeholders and identifying their perceived stakes, 2) structuring organizational processes to reflect and align organizational and stakeholder goals and expectations, and 3) negotiating transactions or ‘‘bargains’’ with stakeholders sufficient for ‘‘balancing’’ competing interests and surfacing discontent. On this model, achieving a high-level of capability, indeed, the very ‘‘bottom line’’ for SMC, comes down to the success or failure of transactional exchanges (Freeman, 1984, p.69). Provided that managers execute ‘‘win–win’’ exchanges, SMC promises a powerful and useful heuristic for effective strategic management (Carroll and Bucholtz, 2006). Despite the optimism, this strategic and largely instrumental approach has come under fire. It is rightly pointed out that although a transactional account of stakeholder relationships may help to balance stakeholder currencies, SMC fails to provide managerial direction regarding how to conceptualize, address, and resolve normative interests that resist commoditization. Adapting a common example, normative demands for the end of ‘‘sweatshop’’ labor are often not leveraged as pleas for balancing the transactional interests of ‘‘slave’’ labor against the interests of the business organization. 396 Abe Zakhem On the contrary, claims of this kind constitute outright rejections of exploitive labor practices by way of a universal appeal to non-transferable human rights. Without much effort we can identify a wide variety of similar claims (e.g., deeply held community values and demands for corporate legitimacy) that call for the recognition and enforcement of deeply held and non-economic moral obligations. To reduce such interests to the status of negotiable assets seems both morally objectionable and too simple a model for effectively capturing the complex nature of normative conflict (Orts and Strudler, 2002, p.222). The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that any single strategic initiative can serve as a normative flash point for competing stakeholder conceptions of that, which is good, right, and legitimate. Certainly, the normative and practical limitations of a purely transactional orientation to stakeholder management constitutes a recognized concern. Within stakeholder literature, this concern has been met with rather traditional and largely deontological attempts to instill in managerial analysis a ‘‘moral point of view’’ that is sufficient for integrating conceptions of the good and the right (Evan and Freeman, 1993). Expanding the debate, this paper addresses normative SMC concerns from a discourse–theoretical perspective. Accordingly, the first part of the paper outlines the central features of Ju¨rgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and political theory and sets up a general framework for a discourse–theoretical approach. Particular attention will be paid to defining a ‘‘moral point of view’’ from a discourse ethical perspective. The second part advances previous applications of Habermasian critical theory to stakeholder management by recasting the SMC categories of rational, process, and transactional analysis in light of central discourse–theoretical principles. Finally, the third and final part summarizes the following conclusions. First, that rational stakeholder mapping should be regarded as a dynamic and discursive process that is ultimately driven towards mutual understanding and participatory solidarity. Second, that overcoming gaps between discourse and practice requires continued process analysis at both strategic and operational levels. Lastly, that the ‘‘bottom line’’ for SMC must be determined from a ‘‘moral point of view.’’ Communicative action and discourse Echoing prominent social action theory, Habermas supports the claim that social solidarity and order require a basic level of norm regulated coordination and conduct. Moving beyond traditional attempts to account for the ‘‘binding’’ power of social norms, Habermas advances the concept of communicative practices. Properly defined, communicative practices refer to those social interactions that are driven towards dialogically motivating, sustaining, and renewing intersubjective consensus and mutual understanding (Habermas, 1984, p.17). In short, Habermas explains that speakers of a language express criticizable validity claims concerning how social action ‘‘ought to be’’ structured. Speakers further warrant that, if called upon, they will provide publicly justified reasons and point to shared convictions that support their contentions. Understanding the very conditions of validity, hearers likewise commit to respond with counteracting reasons in the event of disagreement and dispute. Collectively, both parties commit to an intersubjective and consensual process of reasoning with the illocutionary goal of achieving mutual understanding. Habermas refers to this process as ‘‘communicative reasoning’’ (Habermas, 1984, p.11). Within this framework, social norms ultimately owe their ‘‘binding’’ force to the fact that definitive obligations on the parts of speakers and hearers are incurred in the collective pursuit of rational and consensual agreement. Although foundational, communicative practices certainly do not account for or adequately explain all of the mechanisms affecting social order and coordination. In fact, communicative appeals are often rejected in favor of dogmatically held worldviews and perlocutionary aims and goals. Habermas uses the category of ‘‘rational-purposive’’ action to explain the mode of reasoning at work in such situations. As opposed to communicative reasoning and action, rational-purposive reasoning is not oriented towards mutual understanding and consent and tends to assess situational significance relative to an agent’s own ‘‘privately held’’ interests and standards of choice. Although a necessary component of social interaction and coordination, Habermas observes that lifeworld orientations dominated by operationalized forms of rational-purposive reasoning tend to Stakeholder Management Capability reduce meaningful action to ‘‘strategic action.’’ Strategic actions are thusly defined as attempts to influence situations and the behavior of other social agents with the intent of advancing individual ends (Habermas, 1984). The pervasive rationalization of strategic orientations, however, carries with it two interrelated problems and one clear way out. First, Habermas observes that the reduction of meaningful social interaction to strategic considerations resoundingly erodes the communicative ‘‘glue’’ that produces mutual understanding and social solidarity. This erosion in turn contributes to such social pathologies as lifeworld fragmentation, legitimation crises, anomie, alienation, and social dissonance (Habermas, 1987, p.143). Second, strategic actions tend to devolve into the use and application of morally questionable means, such as force, threats, violence, or inducements to manipulate rational opponents. For Habermas, the solution to this problem does not rely on a simple denunciation of strategic actions. If we desire to avoid the ill effects of strategic action, then we first ought to harmonize our plans and pursue our individual and private goals on the condition of communicative agreement (Habermas, 1984, p.86). In other words, communicative agreement and action must serve as the horizon against which strategic actions are understood, evaluated, and harmonized. When communicative bonds are broken, which is often the case in modern, pluralistic societies, we require a complementary process through which the ‘‘fabric’’ of communicative action is repaired (Smith, 2004, pp. 318–320). In order to draw out such a process, recall Habermas’ theory of communicative action. As noted, communicative action rests on expressed warrants and commitments directed towards an intersubjective and dialogical pursuit of mutual understanding. Distinct from motivating rational participants by way of brute force or enticement, the rationality inherent in communicative practices is ‘‘seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons’’ (Habermas, 1984, p.17). Further, all competent speakers of language are aware of these conditions of validity and likewise bear some level of communicative obligation. Thus from the very beginning, communicative practices point to a highly cognitive and ‘‘argumentative’’ form of conflict resolution. In this sense, 397 ‘‘argumentation’’ does not refer to mere rhetorical debate. On the contrary, ‘‘argumentation’’ marks a reflective form of communicative action whereby competent speakers can thematize and dispute operative validity claims with the aim of achieving mutual understanding (Habermas, 1984, p. 25). In other words, Habermas regards the turn towards argumentation as constituting a rational ‘‘court of appeal’’ that makes it possible to reestablish communicative understanding in spite of participatory disagreement (Habermas, 1984, p.17–18). Habermas further explains that efforts to argumentatively preserve communicative action in the face of disagreement must meet certain dialogical conditions. In general, these dialogical conditions must collectively ensure that validity claims are the objects of discussion and that discursive outputs reflect an intersubjective and rationally motivated agreement. Habermas specifies certain dialogical conditions within the framework of the discourse principle (D). In its most basic form, (D) states that ‘‘just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 107). As such, (D) is the point of view from which norms of action can be impartially justified. Implied by (D), the general requirements for rational discourse include: the exclusion of coercive forces and strategic influences, truthfulness, freedom of access to information, equal participatory rights, and reciprocal role taking and ‘‘ideal role taking,’’ or the reciprocal reversal and checking of participatory points of view. As such, discourse creates the necessary space whereby competent speakers disengage from problematized action contexts, isolate validity claims, and reach a rationally and communicatively motivated agreement (Habermas, 1996, pp.108–109). Whereas (D) represents an ‘‘ideal’’ and ‘‘irreducible’’ order that is ‘‘built into’’ communicatively structured forms of life in general, actual discourses take on different forms and require different sorts of discursive rules. Much of Habermas’ more recent work in political theory and discourse ethics relies on distinguishing the separate realms of pragmatic, ethical, moral, and legitimacy based discourses (Habermas, 1996; 1993; 1990). While each form of discourse in some way reflects (D) and thus requires the same basic sorts of discursive rules, operationalized discourses differ with respect to various features: 398 Abe Zakhem the discursive goals at hand, argumentative criteria, the required level of preexisting and background consensus, the scope of the validity claim in question, and the status of discursive participants (Reed, 1999). In short, as the nature of the validity claim in question changes, the contours of rational discourse likewise change and imply different and more or less stringent cognitive and procedural demands. In order to draw out these distinctions, the following sub-sections briefly explain the different forms of discourse and clarify that which constitutes and gives dialogical weight to reasoning from a ‘‘moral point of view.’’ Pragmatic discourse Pragmatic discourse centers on collectively determining the ‘‘best’’ way to achieve predetermined ends, preferences, and goals. While engaged in pragmatic discourse, participants advance various strategic or technical recommendations and evaluate possible courses of action in light of accepted decision-making criteria. More often than not, pragmatic strategies are assessed against a standard of efficiency and direct participatory attention towards the critical evaluation of empirical data (Habermas, 1996, p. 160). The selection of the particular strategy would then provide a rational basis for implementing certain situational definitions and norms and providing a context for understanding and interacting with others. It is critical to note that a discursive assessment of pragmatic validity claims requires a high-level of preexisting communicative consensus relative to that which is determined to be good, right, and legitimate. So, even as (D) ideally requires the consideration of all possibly affected persons, pragmatic discourse must draw on a previously achieved communicative consensus. Accordingly, the outputs of pragmatic discourse constitute ‘‘hypothetical’’ imperatives, ultimately grounded in particular and historically and culturally contingent social action situations. When this shared level of meaning is called into question (i.e., the validity claims turn from pragmatic contestations to questions concerning the good, right, or legitimate), the application of (D) takes a different form as do the corresponding features of rational discourse. Ethical discourse Distinct from pragmatic discourse, the goal of ethical discourse is to collectively determine that which is ‘‘good’’ for an individual, community, or association. As such, ethical discourse counts as one distinct realm of normativity (Reed, 1999b). Engaging in ethical discourse involves proffering arguments in the form of ‘‘clinical advice’’ with the intent of reaching a consensus over guiding values or ‘‘deep preferences.’’ In other words, ethical discourse engages participants in a higher form of self-clarification and understanding by which they become reflectively aware of deeper, ‘‘normative consonances in a common form of life’’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 160–161). Unlike pragmatic claims, ethical arguments are assessed against a standard of authenticity and direct participatory attention towards the critical evaluation of various forms of the ‘‘good’’ life. The selection of an authentic identity would then provide a rationally motivated and evaluative basis for assessing certain pragmatic claims (e.g., organizational goals, aims, values, and pragmatic argumentative criterion), determining situational definitions, and interacting and engaging with others. Similar to strategic determinations regarding the ‘‘best’’ technical recommendations, it is important to note that conceptions of the ‘‘good’’ are also grounded in particular, non-generalizable life histories, the validity claims therein constituting hypothetical or conditional imperatives that are issued from and evaluated against the backdrop of certain unproblematic meaning structures. Within ethical discourse, (D) is likewise indirectly applied as appealing to all members sharing particular ‘‘traditions and strong evaluations’’ (Habermas, 1996, p.108). Yet, when the unproblematic meaning structures required for ethical discourse are called into question, notably, on grounds that particular ways of life are unjust or illegitimate, an application of (D) makes additional demands. Moral discourse Distinct from both pragmatic and ethical discourse, moral discourse is geared towards rationally and collectively determining that which is right. As such, moral questions constitute a second realm of normativity. Specifically, moral discourse involves the redemption of maxims and norms relative to their Stakeholder Management Capability 399 compatibility with the maxims and norms of others (Habermas, 1993, p.6). Towing a decidedly Kantian line, Habermas argues that ‘‘only a maxim that can be generalized from the perspective of all affected counts as a norm that can command general assent and to that extent is worthy of recognition, or, in other words, is morally binding’’ (Habermas, 1993, p.8). For Habermas, however, if we expect to find a rationally motivated and generally binding agreement, then we must throw into relief those questions ‘‘that can be resolved by an appeal to a generalizable interest; in other words, questions of justice’’ (Habermas, 1993, p.151). Parting with Kantian moral theory, considered to permit a monological application of universality, Habermas’ approach rests on the intersubjective and dialogical determination of that which is just. So, while moral discourse requires an application of the principle of universalization (U), it is applied as a rule of argumentation, stating that a norm is valid only if all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities). Correspondingly, (D), as seen from a ‘‘moral point of view’’, requires that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse (Habermas, 1993, pp.65–66). Within this context, a ‘‘moral point of view’’ involves separating out questions of justice and then dialogically testing the validity of social norms vis-a`-vis (U). Distinct from pragmatic and ethical discourse, the cognitive requirements of moral discourse requires an ‘‘idealizing’’ moment of universality that effectively distances participants from the contexts of life in which their ‘‘particular identity’’ is interwoven and as such proffers categorical action norms (Habermas, 1993, p.12). Despite the possibility of moral convergence, there remains the distinct reality that in our complex, pluralistic, and fragmented society conflict between that which is efficacious, good, and are inevitable. legitimacy-based discourse aims at ensuring that pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses are supported and that the outputs of which are reflected in larger political and legislative institutions. Although a complete explication and defense of Habermas’ political theory is well beyond the scope and intent of this paper, the central argument is that legitimacy ultimately derives from the communicative power of citizens (Habermas, 1996, 151). As Darryl Reed explains, ‘‘It is the exercise of communicative action in public discourses (involving moral, ethical, and pragmatic concerns) carried out through a web of political institutions which generates the basis for legitimate law’’ (Reed, 1999b, p.26). Understanding legitimacy in this way, Habermas reconfigures (D) in terms of a principle of democracy: ‘‘only those statues may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation.’’ (Habermas, 1996, p.110) This move carries with it two general implications. First, there must be a system of rights to ensure that (D) can take the shape of a principle of democracy through the medium of law. Primarily, these rights include various guarantees (e.g., freedom of opinion and equal entitlement for influencing political will formation) for securing and balancing private and public autonomy. (Habermas, 1996, pp.128–129) Second, there must be defined principles that serve to ‘‘steer administrative processes and transform communicative power into administrative power’’ (Habermas, 1996, pp.168–176). These principles include ensuring popular sovereignty, political pluralism, equal protection under the law, and the separation of state and society (Habermas, 1996, pp. 122–123). Whereas the previous forms of rational discourse elicit either hypothetical or universal imperatives, the outputs of legitimacy-based discourse reflect a dual nature. The dual faced nature of legal validity is expressed in the fact that legal norms enable the pursuit of self-interest while at the same time stem from a discursive process that carries the mark of communicative legitimacy (Habermas, 1996, p.31). Legitimacy The priority of the right Discourse regarding legitimacy constitutes a third realm of normativity quite distinct from ethical and moral orientations. Playing a largely integrative role, As we have seen, Habermas’ discursive account aims to elaborate communicative means for achieving social solidarity and order, resolving conflict, and 400 Abe Zakhem regulating egoistic pursuits. Success in this endeavor accordingly requires a rather complex array of discourses situated at each of the previously differentiated and operationalized levels. Despite the importance of fostering all forms of discourses, Habermas grants dialogical priority to moral issues. Earlier noted, a ‘‘moral point of view’’ constitutes the privileged and idealized perspective from which questions of justice can be rationally and impartially tested. On what grounds does Habermas support a theory of the right over the good? Well stated in other more detailed commentaries (Rehg, 1994), Habermas accepts as a ‘‘contemporary social fact’’ that our post-traditional world is marked by numerous, fragmented, and conflicting conceptions of the good life. Although perhaps compelling for a particular form of life, ethical and other hypothetical imperatives lack the intersubjective force necessary for communicatively bridging the normative gap between competing forms of life. For Habermas, only norms that find universal assent can serve as a foundation for normatively and communicatively structured social interactions (Rehg, 1994, pp.94– 100). The dialogical priority of the right over the good is explained as follows. If we want to build solidarity and avoid the ill consequences of instrumental reasoning and strategic action, then we must give first priority to rationally and communicatively resolving questions of justice. While moral discourse provides a fundamental basis for universal agreement, the cognitive force behind dialogically motivated moral validity claims is weak and suffers from ‘‘unprecedented’’ cognitive, motivational, and organizational demands (Habermas, 1996, pp.114–118). Simply put, moral discourse requires complementary processes and institutional forms for spreading ‘‘decontextualized’’ moral insight through complex, strategically driven, and pluralistic forms of life. Habermas explains that ‘‘only those forms of life that meet universalist moralities halfway...fulfill the conditions necessary to reverse the abstractive achievements of decontextualization and demotivation’’ (Habermas, 1990, p.109). As we have seen, the formulation of legitimate law and institutions represents a crucial component in achieving this end. We must remember, however, that Habermas understands legitimacy as ultimately deriving its force from the communicative power of citizens. Further, that this communicative power must first be developed vis-a`-vis robust public discourses concerning that which is pragmatic, good, and just. How exactly can we expect to meet universalistic moralities half way? Following Rehg, one should seek incorporate discourse–theoretical intuitions in the decision-making procedures and organizational processes of various types of institutions (Rehg, 1994, 230). Accordingly, Section 2 attempts to meet this demand by drawing out discourse–theoretical implications for SMC rational, process, and transactional analysis. Implications for stakeholder management capability At the beginning of this paper we identified a persistent and unresolved problem with the transactional and largely instrumental foundation of SMC. In short, treating all stakeholder interests as balanceable commodities was found to be morally objectionable and thus unable to capture the complex nature of normative conflict. We now know that stakeholder claims come in different varieties and carry with them distinct cognitive demands. In many cases, stakeholders and business organizations share similar values (e.g., economic efficiency, return on investment, cost minimization) and norms (e.g., principles of meritocracy) sufficient for resolving disputes through traditional, economic means (e.g., transactional bargaining, negotiation, and exchange). At other times, however, stakeholder claims are aimed at criticizing the dominant perspective through which interests are commonly understood and valuated. Such is the case with the example of sweatshop labor presented in the introduction. Stakeholder claims of this kind are decidedly more ‘‘radical’’ in that they serve to challenge prevailing economic and exchange-based horizons of understanding. How are managers to capture and resolve these more radical normative contestations without immediate recourse to transactional decisionmaking models? Unfortunately, SMC fails to provide managers with a coherent framework for answering such questions. Attempts to address this concern by simply asserting that managers ought to in some way ‘‘balance’’ competing conceptions of the good and the right (Evan and Freeman, 1993) are at best left wanting of further explanation and at worst guilty of begging the question. Stakeholder Management Capability A discourse–theoretical approach provides some critical insight as to how to understand and move beyond these difficulties. Essentially, in the face of more radical normative conflict managers may choose to adopt one of two general orientations. Option 1: managers can take a strategic orientation and endeavor to influence stakeholder relationships in ways that advance ‘‘private’’ organizational interests. Although at some level necessary for conducting business, we found that when left unchecked strategic action tends to denigrate into the use of morally questionable means of influence (e.g., coercion, inducement, or even violence). Additionally, relationships that are largely strategic in nature fail to produce the communicative ‘‘glue’’ necessary for a more robust form of mutual understanding and solidarity. Given that both of the problems associated with strategic responses undercut the normative acceptability and practical utility of SMC, we require another approach. Therefore, Option 2: prior to applying strategic standards of evaluation, managers ought to seek a communicatively driven normative consensus between stakeholders regarding generalizable and shared interests. In short, strategic interactions must first be based on and in someway reflect an intersubjective and dialogical recognition of that which is good, right, and legitimate, with special priority given to moral issues. Although there is ongoing philosophical debate over many aspects of Habermas’ theory of communicative action and discourse, a brief review of the business ethics literature suggests that theorists are beginning to note distinct discourse–theoretical advantages over more traditional management approaches. On empirical grounds, a discourse– theoretical approach is said to better describe the nature of stakeholder relationships and draw out a more accurate picture of pluralistic and seemingly divergent stakeholder claims (Waxenberger and Spence, 2003). On economic grounds, the communicative model is proving to be a compelling model for determining and advancing organizational aims and goals (Smith, 2004) and serving as a mechanism for economic coordination (Kesting, 1998). Finally, normative advantages include the ability for a discourse-theoretical approach to systematically incorporate various forms of normative reasoning (e.g., virtue, deontological, and 401 consequentialist approaches), provide a more robust account of social consent (Reed, 1999a), and gain a deeper understanding of human rights and corporate legitimacy (Van de Ven, 2005). Contributing to these ends, the following sub-sections will advance previous attempts to integrate Habermasian critical theory with SMC (Jonker and Foster, 2002) and rethink the traditional categories of rational, process, and transactional analysis in light of central discourse–theoretical principles. Rational level of analysis The first step in enhancing stakeholder management capability is to rationally ‘‘map’’ organization stakeholder groups and define stakes of each. Regardless of the specific analytical techniques involved, applying a discourse–theoretical approach to stakeholder mapping yields two primary conclusions. First, the determination of who and what really counts ought to be the result of operationalized forms of discursive reasoning. Although this requires a rather complex array of multi-leveled discourses, some general suggestions are as follows. At an ethical level, we could expect that managers rationally appraise an organization’s mission, values, and culture and ultimately pose the question, ‘‘Who are we and what would we like to become?’’ Since the determination of organizational identity will necessary cut across and impact various conceptions of the good life, ethical discourses should be structured to include participation from all stakeholders that are part of larger business communities (e.g., employees, shareholders, subcontractors, and local communities). At a moral level, discursive participants will likely extend beyond the traditionally defined business community (e.g., across industries and down supply chains) and consist of all those groups impacted by operative principles of justice, which may include competitors. Within today’s business environment, moral questions will likely focus on issues of economic opportunity, fair trade and competition, fair labor practices and compensation, and fair global development strategies, to name a few. Regarding questions of legitimacy, organizations are minimally required to support the formulation of legitimate law, and where appropriate, actively contribute to the communicative resolution of 402 Abe Zakhem competing pragmatic, ethical, and moral claims. Given the globalized nature of business, organizations should also seek to structure or otherwise reform governmental and non-governmental international institutions based on the discursive principle of democracy. As scholars have already noted, this may be accomplished by modeling international governance bodies and organizational standards in accordance with communicative principles (Steffek, 2003). Second, a rational stakeholder map must represent discursive outputs in their categorically differentiated forms. By treating all stakeholder claims in the same way, we noted that SMC arbitrary elides logical differences between the types of validity claims and thus misses opportunities for rational discourse and mutual understanding. Accordingly, stakeholder maps should now clearly lay out the various types of pragmatic, ethical, moral, and legitimacy-based claims and likewise specify the values, moral norms, and legal norms upon which such claims are founded. In short, managers must understand stakeholders as discursive claimants who leverage various types of normative claims qua community member, natural person, and citizen. This may make stakeholder mapping a more complex and difficult activity. Stakeholders claims, however, can no longer be simply represented as extant interests that are fully captured and strategically understood through the lens of transactional exchange. On the contrary, to reduce all stakeholder’s interests to balanceable commodities myopically reduces managerial vision and analysis to only one, largely strategic, aspect of rational analysis. Additionally, stakeholder salience must reflect rational analysis from a moral point of view. Given the dialogical priority of moral questions, managers should highlight those claims that can be resolved in relation to a universalizable interest. Accomplishing this task, rational stakeholder maps should be structured to throw into relief questions of justice, perhaps as ‘‘special characteristics,’’ or those features of stakeholder interaction that indicate a requirement of particular and continued attention. This analysis only points in the direction of some general applications of a discourse–theoretical approach to rational stakeholder mapping. Indeed, much work is still needed to develop specific strategies that support discursive arrangements and analytic techniques for mapping the complex world of stakeholder interaction. This, of course, is no small task. That which should become clear, however, is the determination of stakeholder identity and salience is a now regarded as a dynamic and discursive process that is ultimately driven towards mutual understanding and participatory solidarity. Further, this process will be narrowly or broadly construed depending on the nature of the validity claim in question and the level of required discursive participation. In any event, rational mapping must be designed to effectively move organizations out from cloistered positions of strategic analysis and into a more engaged and normatively structured societal dialogues. This requirement seems perfectly consistent with the spirit and intent of stakeholder management and the goals of rational mapping. Process level of analysis The second step in enhancing an organization’s stakeholder management capability is to align business processes with the normative outputs derived. In line with a discourse-theoretical analysis, organizational processes ought to be evaluated and accordingly restructured in line with shared conceptions of that which is good, right, and legitimate. On the practical front, managers can certainly expect that there will be definitive gaps between discursively determined values, moral norms, and legal norms and actual practice. A particular challenge for bridging the gap between discourse and practice is the fact that business organizations often reflect deep-seated propensities for strategic action and resist evening out unequal distributions of power. In light of this apparent difficulty, pressing questions come to the fore. How can managers effectively integrate communicative and strategic actions? What sorts of organizational process are required to meet normative discourses half way? How can a moral point of view take root in environments hostile to universalistic moralities? Overcoming these challenges requires reconfiguring organizational process at two complementary levels. First, managers ought to bring stakeholders into strategic decision-making processes. Freeman recognizes early on that a primary means for effectively aligning interests is to include stakeholder Stakeholder Management Capability participation at various levels of strategic planning. (Freeman, 1983; Freeman, 1984, p.69). In this way, stakeholders will set the strategic tone for a business organization from the top down. In discourse–theoretical terms this implies that bridging the gap between rational analysis and practice requires stakeholder representation in a variety of executive and operationalized forms of pragmatic discourse. To this point, there has been a considerable amount of research suggesting how this can actually be accomplished. Jeffery Smith, for example, cites several examples (e.g., at Saturn Corporation) where organizations successfully link the pursuit of strategic ends and communicatively oriented actions (Smith, 2004). Other scholars have developed communicative means for effective environmental analysis, screening, and reporting (Wiklund, 2005; Dayton, 2002), enterprise planning (Dillard and Yuthas, 2006), and strategic development efforts in developing countries (Reed, 2002). Bringing stakeholders into higherlevel strategic and pragmatic discourses, however, is but one piece of the puzzle. Bridging the gap between discourse and practice requires additional process analysis. Second, managers ought to analyze and design management systems to ensure that an organization’s day-to-day operations reflect and meet stakeholder claims. Complementing efforts at the strategic planning level, stakeholders will also need to set the operational tone of an organization from the bottom up, so to speak. Unfortunately, as others have pointed out, this aspect of process analysis, once prominent in Freeman’s earlier writings, has since been unduly neglected (Jonker and Foster 2002, p.190). Turning our attention to this level of analysis from a discourse– theoretical perspective yields valuable insight. In particular, it means that management systems should be in place to ensure that shared conceptions of the good, right, and legitimate are communicatively reflected in an organization’s everyday operations. Although there are many types of management systems that could fit the bill, there are good reasons for suggesting that modeling organizational ethics programs along discourse–theoretical lines is a good starting place. First, ethical programs have proven to be effective and systematic means for positively influencing organizational-ethical culture (Izraeli and Schwartz, 1998). Second, the key components for an 403 effective ethics program are well defined in US federal law and flexible enough to apply to all types of business organizations (Palmer and Zakhem, 2001). Finally, there is a growing movement that suggests that ethical programs should be designed and ultimately evaluated from a ‘‘moral point of view’’ (Reynolds and Bowie, 2004). Although we cannot apply discourse–theoretical principles to all components of a robust ethical program, several implications seem obvious. Ethical codes of conduct, mission statements, and procedures should appropriately reflect shared values, moral norms, and legal norms. Such documentation should be communicatively transmitted, understood at all levels of the organization, and be open to rational criticism and change. Ethical training programs should include means to develop communicative competence and moral reasoning. Perhaps most importantly, ethical audits should be conducted to both monitor system performance and serve as a catalyst for introducing a moral point of view into company operations and routine processes (Garci´aMarza´, 2005). In other words, ethical program effectiveness and process capability should be audited and evaluated, in large part, against the level of communicatively and discursively achieved agreement and solidarity. Furthermore, the results of ethical audits should be publicly reported in a manner consistent with communicative principles (Yuthas et al., 2002). Again, this analysis only points in the general direction of how to analyze and structure organizational processes from a discourse–theoretical perspective. We should, however, come to the realization that overcoming gaps between discourse and practice requires continued process analysis at all levels of the organization. Transactional level of analysis The final step in enhancing and organization’s stakeholder management capability is for managers to establish and execute ‘‘win–win’’ transactional exchanges with stakeholders. It is through transactional processes that managers must, at some level, engage stakeholders in an effort to surface discontent and ‘‘balance’’ competing claims. In this arena it can also be expected that both managers and stakeholders 404 Abe Zakhem will, and perhaps must, exert some level of strategic influence. While transactional negotiation and exchange should continue to play a central role, it can no longer be regarded as the ‘‘bottom line’’ for stakeholder management. As Robert Phillips recognizes, stakeholder relationships should have moral restrictions rather than being merely strategic in nature (Phillips, 2003, p.38). From a discourse–theoretical perspective, this means that transactional relationships ought to be ultimately judged from a moral point of view. In other words, transactional interactions must first be based on and in someway reflect an intersubjective and dialogical recognition of that which is right. In the complex world of business, however, establishing shared normative convictions through discourse is likely to be an ongoing, fragile, and often open-ended task of argumentation, learning, and continual improvement. Accordingly, managers will potentially need to conduct business and engage stakeholders as transactional partners without necessarily fully realizing moral consensus. In the absence of communicatively established moral norms, however, bargaining can still occur and at least indirectly reflect a moral point of view. As Habermas recognizes, bargaining processes are appropriately tailed for situations in which social power relations cannot be neutralized in the way rational discourses presuppose. Whereas a rationally motivated consensus rests on reasons that convince all parties in the same way, compromised bargains can be accepted by the different parties each for its own different reasons. While transactional bargaining cannot replace moral discourse, it can be regulated from the standpoint of fairness. At a minimum, this requires that all negotiating parties be provided with ‘‘an equal opportunity to influence one another during the actual bargaining, so that all the affected interests can come into play and have equal changes of prevailing.’’ (Habermas, 1996, pp. 165–167) Whether directly or indirectly, the ‘‘bottom line’’ for stakeholder management must be determined from a moral point of view. Concluding remarks In this paper we have articulated and analyzed a persistent problem with SMC transactional analysis and balancing. Recognizing the need to complement SMC analysis with a ‘‘moral point of view,’’ we parted company with traditional normative approaches and recast morality in terms of Habermas’ discourse–theoretical and ultimately communicative perspective. This exegesis leads to several important implications for SMC. 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Department of Philosophy, Seton Hall University, 400 South Orange Avenue, Fahy Hall, South Orange, NJ, 07042, U.S.A E-mail: zakhemab@shu.edu PLACE THIS ORDER OR A SIMILAR ORDER WITH US TODAY AND GET AN AMAZING DISCOUNT :)