the R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul decision, the U.S

Sample Solution

1. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

The U.S. Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) struck down a city ordinance that prohibited the display of symbols that arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment" on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. The Court held that this ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted speech based on content, not merely on the basis of the speaker or the message.

The Court reasoned that the ordinance was content-based because it prohibited speech that expressed bias or hatred against certain groups while permitting speech that expressed bias against other groups. For example, the ordinance would have prohibited a cross burning motivated by racial hatred but would have allowed a cross burning motivated by religious or political beliefs. The Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects even offensive or hateful speech, as long as it does not incite imminent violence.

I agree with the Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. While cross burnings are undoubtedly offensive and harmful, they are also a form of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. To allow the government to punish speech based on its content would open the door to censorship and the suppression of dissent.

2. Todd Mitchell Case

In Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state statute that enhanced penalties for crimes motivated by racial bias. The Court reasoned that the statute did not punish speech but rather punished conduct that was both criminal and motivated by a discriminatory intent.

Full Answer Section

The Court distinguished Mitchell from R.A.V. by noting that the statute in Mitchell did not prohibit speech based on content but rather punished a specific act (in this case, a racially motivated assault) that was already illegal under state law. The Court held that the enhanced penalty was a permissible content-based restriction because it did not punish the speech itself but rather the conduct that was motivated by that speech.

I agree with the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. The statute in question did not punish the speech of expressing racial hatred but rather punished the harmful conduct that was motivated by that speech. This is a distinction that the Court has consistently recognized in its First Amendment jurisprudence.